Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Dvarim

Hemdat Yamim Parshat Devarim, 4 Av 5762 ========================================================= This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of R' Meir ben Yechezkel Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m. ========================================================= Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbi's to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship coupled with community service, ensures its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations and the strongest connection to Jewish communities worldwide. =========================================================== Summary of a Summary The sefer of Devarim is unique in several ways, some of which we will at least mention. We hope our discussion serves as a springboard for thought and future study. Chazal refer to Devarim as "Mishneh Torah," based on the pasuk (Devarim 17:18), which, paradoxically, refers to the entire Torah (see Sifrei, ad loc.) This term hints at the nature of the content of the sefer, which is primarily a review. As R. Akiva (Chagiga 6b) said: "The principles of the Torah and its details were said at Har Sinai, were repeated at Ohel Moed, and were said a third time at Arvot Moav (Bnei Yisrael's location during Sefer Devarim- see 1:5)." The first Tosafot in Gittin goes as far as to say that the break of 4 lines between sefer and sefer is qualitatively different for the break between Bamidbar and Devarim because the latter is a review of the whole Torah. Much of Devarim is written as a personal address by Moshe Rabbeinu, as opposed to the Torah's own narrative or texts dictated by Hashem to Moshe. The beloved phrase, "וידבר ד' אל משה לאמר", which is found 89 times between Shemot, Vayikra, and Bamidbar, appears only once in Devarim. Lest we come to the heretical conclusion that Devarim is a man-written sefer (see the harsh words of Sanhedrin 99a), the first five p'sukim put the historical and bibliographical framework in perspective. As pasuk 3 says, although Moshe speaks in first person through much of the sefer, it is all as Hashem commanded him to tell Bnei Yisrael and record in the Torah. In deciphering the riddle-laden first two psukim, the mepharshim argue deeply as to whether these speeches were originally made earlier by Moshe and were repeated and incorporated into the Torah before Moshe's death, or whether Moshe was sharing these words with them for the first time (see Rashi, Ramban, Abarbanel, Mallbim,...) The Mallbim explains that the opening passages of Devarim contain a double introduction. "These are the words" (1:1) refers to the words of encouragement and mussar in the first section of the sefer (until ch. 12). "Moshe began to explain this Torah" (1:5) refers to the halachic section (12:1-26:19). The final few parshiyot revert back to the relatively standard style of Torah narrative, describing the last day of Moshe's life. Certainly, the very end of the Torah leaves us with one of the most disputed questions about the Torah. There are differing opinions in Chazal on whether Moshe or Yehoshua recorded these eight p'sukim, beginning with "And Moshe...died" (see Bava Batra 15a). ==================================================== P'ninat Mishpat - Ona'ah (Mispricing) - part II - Different Levels of Mispricing The basic numerical rule regarding ona'ah is stated by Rava in Bava Metzia 50b. If the level of mispricing is less than one sixth, the sale stands as is. If it is greater than a sixth, the entire sale is void, and the money and object are returned to the original owners. If the mispricing is a sixth, then the sale stands, but money changes hands until the amount paid conforms to the proper one. Although the possibility that the price will be off by exactly a sixth seems remote, it should be noted that there are different ways of calculating a sixth. The gap between these calculations allows for a certain range of prices where the law of returning the ona'ah and keeping the sale applies (see Bava Metzia 49b; Choshen Mishpat 227:2 for details). The reason that mispricing of less than a sixth brings on no practical consequences is that there is a presumed, tacit mechila (relinquishing of rights) by the one who was cheated if the amount was so small (Rambam, Mechira 12:3). A crucial question is whether it is permitted to misprice by this not so significant amount of money or whether, despite the mechila, the aveira of ona'ah applies. The Rosh (Bava Metziya IV:20) and Shulchan Aruch (CM 227:6) leave this as an open question, with the Rosh urging the G-d fearing to avoid such inaccuracies, specifically if one side is aware of the real price and the other is not. ===================================================== Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) Executors of Will vs. Non-profit Organization - part I (excerpts from Chavot Binyamin siman 61) A philanthropist pledged a large sum of money to a non-profit organization for a building project but died before fulfilling the pledge. He appointed executors to distribute a portion of his estate among tzedaka causes, according to their judgment. The executors decided not to honor the pledge but preferred to use that sum for other institutions. [Much of the following is a response to and partial corroboration of the decision of Rav Yisraeli's fellow dayan, Harav Y.S. Elyashiv, shlita We shall concentrate more on the ideas behind the p'sak din than on its specific, complex sources.] The philanthropist's pledge was done without a kinyan, yet it might be binding for the following reason. There is a rule that a commitment to the Beit Hamikdash, even if oral, is binding like a full kinyan. There is an uncertainty whether this rule applies to pledges of tzedaka, which, in our case, would bind the executors to fulfill the obligation of the deceased. On questionable, financial obligations like this, we generally say hamotzi mechavero alav har'aya (he who wants to extract money from his counterpart must have a convincing evidence). However, the question here is whether there is a muchzak (a person with possession, from whom we need to extract money). The executors have no claim of ownership on the disputed money. It does not even appear that they have tovat hana'ah, the right to choose the recipients of the money in a manner which provides them indirect benefit. The will's language indicates that the executors were given authority to choose causes based on their merit, not based on the executors' benefit or desires. In the absence of a muchzak, the organization which was promised money can lay claim based on the possibility that an oral commitment to tzedaka is binding. A counter claim was raised that the executors, who promised funding from the estate for other organizations, were muchzakim on behalf of those organizations. Thus, the claim of the first organization is an attempt to extract money from them. However, we have a rule that one may not grab money on behalf of one creditor at the expense of other creditors (Bava Metzia 10a). Likewise here, the executors cannot be considered holding on to the money on behalf of the institutions of their choice. Even if we follow the opinion that a shaliach (agent) of a creditor may grab money on his behalf, that scenario does not apply here. The executors do not claim to be personal agents of any given institution but that they want to use the money correctly. Their opinion of who deserves support should not give anyone an advantage by making it muchzak? [We continue next week]. ===================================================== Ask the Rabbi Question: I want to attend a sporting event. Ticket sales begin on Shabbat and are expected to be finished by day's end. May I ask a non-Jew to buy tickets for himself, hinting that I will buy them from him after Shabbat for a higher price? Answer: The general rule about arranging before Shabbat for a non-Jew to do work for you on Shabbat is as follows. If the non-Jew is considered to be acting independently for his own benefit, it is permitted even though the Jew gains from the action. If halacha views him as serving as some type of shaliach (agent) of the Jew, it is forbidden. The classical poskim arrived at a variety of practical distinctions based on this rule. One may not pay a non-Jew to be his employee (poel) on Shabbat. However he may give a non-Jew a job to do if he is paid the by specific job (kablan), not for his commitment to do work on the Jew's behalf (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 247:1). There are many details and sub-distinctions on the matter, such as on extended relationships and marit ayin issues when it looks like he is the Jew's employee, but these are beyond this response's scope. What is most pertinent to us is the rule that the Jew may not demand even of a kablan that the work be done on Shabbat (ibid.) Even if the Jew does not specify that he work on Shabbat, if it is necessary in order to accomplish the job as specified, the prohibition applies (Mishna Berura 307:13). This seems to apply in your case, as paying him for the task of buying the tickets requires doing so on Shabbat. However, the non-Jew is considered working for you only if the work relates to you with a certain level of directness. Therefore, while a Jew may not give money to a non-Jew to buy a commodity for him on Shabbat, he may suggest to him to buy it with his own money and hint that he will likely buy it from the non-Jew after Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:3). Hagahot Maimoniot (Shabbat 6:2) and Hagahot Mordechai (452) learn this from the fact that one can sell chametz to a non-Jew with the understanding that he will buy it back (see Shulchan Aruch OC 448:4). Since several achronim allow the Jew to give an oral assurance to buy back the chametz if the sale is unconditional (Mishna Berura 448:23), one can likewise promise the non-Jew to buy the tickets after Shabbat (ibid. 307:13). There are even those who allow the Jew to lend the non-Jew money to buy the tickets since at the time of the purchase, the money is the non-Jew's (Shulchan Aruch Harav 307:10). In summary, suggest a deal; don't tell him to buy.

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